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Abstract
In the standard formulation of mechanism design, a key assumption is that the designer has
reliable information and technology to determine a prior distribution over types of the agents.
In the meanwhile, as pointed out by the Wilson’s Principle, a mechanism should reply as little
as possible on the accuracy of prior type distribution. In this paper, we put forward a simple
model to formalize and justify this statement.
In our model, each agent has a type distribution. In addition, the agent can commit to
a fake type distribution and bids consistently with respect to the fake distribution (i.e., plays
some Bayes equilibrium under the fake distributions). The model is partially motivated by a
recent consensus in the literature that the prior distribution should not be endogenous to the
model but has to be learned by the designer from the agents’ past bids.
We are interested in the equilibria of the induced distribution-committing games in several
well-known mechanisms. Our results can be summarized as follows: (1) the game induced by
Myerson auction under our model is strategically equivalent to the first-price auction under the
standard model. Consequently, they are revenue-equivalent. (2) the second-price auction yields
no less revenue than several reserve-based and virtual-value-based truthful, prior-dependent
auctions, under our fake distribution model. These results complement a recent research agenda
on prior-independent mechanism design.
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1 Introduction
Many standard auction settings assume that buyers’ prior type distributions are common knowledge
among all buyers and the seller. For example, the seminal Myerson auction [19] uses this distribution
knowledge to calculate the so-called virtual values. However, this assumption does not necessarily
hold in practice: when facing new buyers, the seller may not know anything about the buyers’
valuations. Even for repeated buyers, the seller still needs to infer the buyers’ valuation distributions
from the past bids by some, possibly inaccurate, algorithms. Such inaccuracy in type distributions
may still compromise the theoretical optimality of such prior-dependent mechanisms.
1.1 The model
In this paper, we propose a model where buyers can credibly manipulate the prior distributions.
In our model, each buyer has a true type distribution, just as in the standard mechanism design
formulation. In addition, each buyer can pretend as if his type is from another distribution, which
we call the fake distribution. The way that he convinces others, including the seller, that his type
is indeed drawn from the fake distribution, is by consistently playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium in
the mechanism as if his type distribution is the fake distribution. Such strategy is realistic as long
as the buyers can commit to the fake distributions and doing so increases their expected payoffs.
The model captures a number of important ingredients in the practice of mechanism design.
First of all, it captures the fact that prior information is not endogenous to the model, but has to
come from the agents’ past data. For example, in sponsored search auctions [12], it is standard
that the prior distributions are estimated from the past bids [20, 21, 6]. This makes the prior
distributions a part of agents’ strategy, rather than endogenous inputs to the mechanism.
Secondly, it captures a certain dynamic aspect of mechanism design. Our model can be regarded
as a sequence of iterations between 1) the seller adjusts their prior estimates of the buyers’ valuations
based on the bids observed so far; and 2) the buyers strategically best respond, given the current
prior estimate and the fact that their current bids will be used as future priors. Analysis of such
dynamics can be complicated. Alternatively, our model focus on the analysis of the steady state
resulted from a long, converged sequence of iterations. In our model, this steady state corresponds
to a Nash equilibrium of the induced distribution-reporting game.
Thirdly, it helps explain certain underbidding behaviors in prior-dependent auctions. Many
truthful auctions in standard setting are no longer “truthful” in fake distribution setting.
Last but not least, the model allows one to quantify the damage caused by relying on prior
information and to prescribe more realistically the outcomes one should expect in these auctions.
Example 1.1. Consider the Myerson auction where there are two buyers, each with valuation drawn
independently identically from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Assume that the first buyer always
bids his true valuation. In other words, the buyer’s bid distribution is also a uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. We are interested in what the second buyer should behave. Suppose that the second buyer
always bids a small positive number . By observing the bids distributions for a sufficiently long
period, the seller would believe that the first buyer’s valuation from the uniform [0, 1], while the
second buyer valuation is exactly .
In the Myerson auction,the first buyer’s virtual value is 2v1 − 1 when his true type is v1, while
the second buyer’s virtual value is always . The item is allocated to the second buyer if and only if
2v1 − 1 < , of which the probability is (+ 1)/2. As a result, the second buyer obtains an expected
utility of
∫ 1
0
+1
2 (v − )dv = (+1)(1−2)4 .
Compared to the case where the second buyer commits to the truthful distribution (i.e., uniform
[0, 1]) and obtains an expected utility of 1/12, his utility strictly increases. We will later prove
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that each buyer reporting a uniform distribution on [1/4, 1/2] is an equilibrium in the induced
(distribution-reporting) game.
One might argue that the model assumes too much rationality on the buyer side, since the
buyers need to figure out the equilibrium of fake distributions. One justification is that, the agents
may not need to compute the correct fake distribution upfront, but can learn to do this over time via
some learning dynamic that converges to the correct distributions in the steady state as mentioned.
1.2 Our contributions
We report a few interesting findings when applying this model to the single-item auction domain.
To justify why we can focus on truthful auctions, we first prove a version of revelation principle for
this model, stating that one can without loss of generality restrict attention to truthful auctions.
Theorem 1.1 For any prior-independent mechanism family, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
each buyer to report his true distribution.
This suggests that it might be more interesting to look at prior-dependent auctions. We then
apply this model to the revenue-optimal auction, aka. the Myerson auction, where we prove one
of our main theorems that says the Myerson auction under fake distribution setting is strategically
equivalent to the first-price auction in the standard setting.
Theorem 1.2. Given buyers’ true distributions, the induced distribution-reporting game of My-
erson auction is strategically equivalent to first-price auction in the standard setting.
As a result, the two games are revenue equivalent. In other words, Myerson revenue in the fake
distribution model is reduced to the revenue of the first-price auction game in the standard setting.
We extend our analysis to a similar prior-dependent auction that has been studied in the
literature, called second-price auction with monopoly (i.e., Myerson’s) reserve [15, 11].
Theorem 1.3 Given that the buyers’ true distributions are i.i.d. regular, the revenue of second-
price auction with monopoly reserve under the equilibrium of fake distribution is the same as the
revenue of second-price auction under the true (or equivalently, fake) distribution.
It is important to distinguish Myerson auction and second-price auction with monopoly reserve,
even in the i.i.d. case. The allocation rules of the two auctions are the same under the true
distribution, but different when computing the equilibrium of fake distributions: to consider a
possible deviation, a buyer can report any fake distribution, creating an instance of non-i.i.d.
distributions, where the allocation rules for both auctions differ.
We further generalize the idea of prior-dependent reserve pricing by analyzing second price
auction with a random reserve, which has also been extensively studied in the literature [16, 11].
Theroem 1.4 Given that the buyers’ true distributions are i.i.d., the revenue of second-price
auction with any single-sample (aka. random) reserve under the equilibrium of fake distribution is
no more than the revenue of second-price auction under the true distribution.
We finally apply this model to a general class of truthful auctions called virtual efficient auctions,
in which the allocation rule is efficient, with respect to a general definition of virtual value function.
Theroem 1.5 Given that the buyers’ true distributions are i.i.d., the revenue of any virtual efficient
mechanism family under the equilibrium of fake distribution is no more than the revenue of second-
price auction under the true distribution.
To sum up, for all symmetric cases, second-price auction is superior compared to other auctions
considered in this paper. The comparison between Myerson and second-price auction is unknown
in the asymmetric case since the BNE of First-price auction is unknown [7, 22].
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1.3 Relative work
Recently, there has been a large body of literature on the problem of prior-independent mechanism
design [1, 2, 9, 13, 14]. One of the major motivations of these papers is the so-called Wilson’s princi-
ple [23] , which states that a mechanism should reply as little as possible on the prior distributions.
Over the years, the principle has guided many practical auction designs and has been consistent
with experiences: auctions that heavily rely on prior distributions are in general not robust and
rarely used. Our model can be regarded as a quantitative model for the Wilson’s principle.
Independent of our work, a few recent papers [18, 8, 10] also consider the general problem
where a single strategic buyer repeatedly interacts with the seller. The focus of all these papers
is on the dynamic and learning aspect of the problem where the buyer learns to play equilibrium.
Mohri and Medina [18] consider a model where the seller posts a price in each time period to a
buyer whose valuation is independent random draw in each period. They introduce a notation
called − strategic buyer where the buyer does not necessarily best respond in each round. They
design a sequential posted prices that achieves additive bounds to optimal revenue in two different
settings. Chen and Wang [8] study the same setting and make the assumption that the action of
the buyer in each round is so chosen as to maximize his overall discounted utility. They show that
the seller can design a posted price mechanism that can almost surely learn the buyer’s true type
and achieve constant additive bound to optimal revenue. Devanur et. al. [10] analyze the perfect
Bayesian equilibria in a repeated game where the buyer acts strategically and the seller updates
his belief of the prior distribution. We remark that our model, even though admits a dynamic and
learning interpretation, is still a single-shot distribution-reporting game.
Caillaud and Robert [5] consider implementation of Myerson auction in a prior-independent
fashion. They assume that at least one buyer knows the prior distribution of the winning buyer.
Izmalkov [17] also discusses the implementation of the revenue maximization auction via English
auction by shill biddings. While both work and ours are related in that we all study mechanism
design from the perspective of priors, our goal is different in that we focus on the study of strategical
manipulation of prior distributions.
2 The fake distribution model
In a single item auction, an auctioneer has a single item to sell to n buyers. Each buyer i has a
private valuation vi towards the item, where each vi is drawn from a distribution Fi. Bulow and
Roberts [3] give a convenient representation of a distribution called quantile.
Definition 2.1. (Quantile). Given a random variable v with cumulative distribution F (v), let
q = 1 − F (v) ∈ [0, 1] denote the quantile of v. The function v(q) = F−1(1 − q) : [0, 1] → R+ is a
mapping from the quantile space to valuation space, and is uniquely determined by distribution F .
We use v(·) to denote the distribution of v in the quantile space. Note that q is always uniformly
distributed on [0,1] and v(·) is weakly monotone decreasing. Let R(q) = qv(q) denote the revenue
curve of distribution v(·).
We write q = (q1, q2, ..., qn) for the profile of quantiles for all bidders. Let F denote the set of all
weakly monotone decreasing functions that maps [0, 1] to R+. We write f(·) = (f1(·), f2(·), ..., fn(·)) ∈
Fn for the profile of n arbitrary distributions in Fn. Now we suppose that each vi is drawn from
distribution vi(·) ∈ F . We write v(·) = (v1(·), ..., vn(·)) for the profile of valuation distributions.
Sometimes we call this profile the true distributions. In our setting, the true distributions v(·) is
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unknown to the seller1.
In our model, each buyer reports a new distribution vˆi(·) that may be different from vi(q), called
the fake distribution. We use vˆ(·) = (vˆ1(·), ..., vˆn(·)) to denote the profile of fake distributions.
Definition 2.2. (Mechanism)
Given prior f(·), a (direct) mechanism consists of an allocation rule xi : Rn+ → [0, 1] and a
payment rule ti : Rn+ → R, for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Note that both xi and ti are implicitly dependent on the prior. This motivates the following
definition of mechanism family, which explicitly addresses this fact.
Definition 2.3. (Mechanism Family)
A mechanism family {M f(·)|f(·) ∈ Fn} is a collection of mechanisms, one for each prior, so
that each mechanism M f(·) in it takes f(·) as the prior.
Under a mechanism, we use function bi(·) : [0, 1]→ R+ to denote bidder i’s bidding strategy.
Given prior f(·), bidding strategy profile b(·) = (b1(·), ..., bn(·)) and buyer i’s quantile qi, define
the interim allocation as follows:
x∗i (qi) = Eb−i [xi(bi, b−i)] =
∫
q−i
xi(bi(qi),b−i(q−i))dq−i,
and interim payment as follows:
t∗i (qi) = Eb−i [ti(bi, b−i)] =
∫
q−i
ti(bi(qi),b−i(q−i))dq−i.
In order for the seller and other bidders to verify the fake distribution, the bidders need to play
a Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism, under the fake distribution profile. Formally
Definition 2.4. (Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE)) Given M vˆ(·), the bidding strategy profile b(·) =
(b1(·), b2(·), ..., bn(·)) is a BNE of the mechanism, if
bi(qi) ∈ arg max
b
∫
q−i
(vˆi(qi)xi(b, b−i(q−i))− ti(b, b−i(q−i)))dq−i
= arg max
bi(qi)
vˆi(qi)x
∗
i (qi)− t∗i (qi), ∀i = 1, ..., n ∀qi ∈ [0, 1]
If the bidding strategy profile b(·) = vˆ(·) is a BNE, we say the mechanism M vˆ(q) is Bayes
Incentive Compatible (BIC). If vˆi(qi)x
∗
i (qi) − t∗i (qi) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n ∀qi ∈ [0, 1], we say it is ex-
post individually rational (IR).
With the notations ready, the timing of our model can be conveniently described as follows:
1. The seller commits to a mechanism family {M f(·)|f(·) ∈ Fn}.
2. Buyers choose fake distributions vˆ(·).
3. Buyers play BNE of the mechanism M vˆ(·).
Let Φ denote the set of all one-on-one mappings φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1].
We, as analysts, are interested in the equilibrium of the induced game:
1To compute equilibrium distribution of the induced game in the steady state, a sufficient condition is to assume
that v(·) is common knowledge among the buyers.
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Definition 2.5. (Induced game) Given a mechanism family {M f(·)|f(·) ∈ Fn}), the induce game
is a normal-form game (N,A,U) where
• N = {1, ..., n} is the set of buyers,
• A = A1×...×An. where Ai = F×Φ is the set of actions of buyer i. We use (vˆi(·) ∈ F , φi(·) ∈
Φ) to denote an action of buyer i. This means that, the buyer not only needs to choose a fake
distribution vˆi(·), but also needs to explicitly use φi(·) to map the true distribution to the fake
distribution, from quantile to quantile.
• U = {U1, ..., Un}: the utility function for each buyer.
The necessity of φi(·) follows from the definition of utility of the induced game.
In the definition above, Ui : A→ R denotes the utility function of buyer i, such that
Ui((vˆ1(·), φ1(·)), ..., (vˆn(·), φn(·))) =
∫ 1
0
(x∗i (qi)vi(φi(qi))− t∗i (qi))dqi
Where x∗i (qi) and t
∗
i (qi) are the interim allocation and payment in mechanism M
vˆ(·) at BNE.
After buyer i reports a fake distribution vˆi(·), by the definition of φi(·), buyer i will bid as if
his valuation is vˆi(q), when his true valuation is vi(φ(q)). We will prove in next section that each
buyer i will always want to choose φi(qi) = qi, ∀qi ∈ [0, 1] to maximize his utility. As a result, we
can omit φ from the definition of the induced game and equivalently write Ai = F for short.
Given vˆ(·),
Ui(vˆ(·)) =
∫ 1
0
(x∗i (qi)vi(qi)− t∗i (qi))dqi
Denote by u∗(qi) = x∗i (qi)vi(qi)− t∗i (qi) the interim utility for any fixed qi, so that
Ui(vˆ(·)) =
∫ 1
0
u∗(qi)dqi.
Game theoretical notions, such as Nash Equilibrium and best response are standard in the
induced game. We sometimes refer to Nash equilibrium simply as equilibrium in the induced game.
Definition 2.6. Given vˆ(·), the seller’s revenue is
REV =
n∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
t∗i (qi)dqi =
n∑
i=1
∫
q
ti(b(q))dq
3 Technical preliminaries
In this section, we present several technical lemmas useful for the analyses of equilibrium in the
induced game of various mechanism families. As mentioned, we only focus on the truthful mech-
anism families. This is justified by the following revelation principle for mechanism families. It
states that, it is with loss of generality to restrict attention to mechanism families where every
mechanism in it is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC).
Lemma 3.1. (Revelation principle for mechanism families) For any mechanism family {M f(·)|f(·) ∈
Fn}, and given a BNE for each M f(·), there exists a new mechanism family {M ′f(·)|f(·) ∈ Fn}, such
that each mechanism M ′f(·) is BIC and implements the same outcome as M f (·) at its truthful BNE.
Moreover, if vˆ(·) is a Nash equilibrium of the induced game of M , it is also a Nash equilibrium of
the induced game of M ′
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A mechanism family is truthful if every mechanism in it is BIC.
With this lemma, we only consider truthful mechanism family {M f(·)|f(·) ∈ Fn} and the truthful
BNE of every mechanism in it.
In the following, we use the interim notations and analyze from the point of view of buyer i as
if he is the only buyer. From now on, we omit the subscript i when it is clear from the context.
Lemma 3.2. For any truthful mechanism family and fixed vˆ(·), the mapping φ(q) = q,∀q ∈ [0, 1]
maximizes the buyer’s utility among all possible one-on-one mappings.
Proof. All missing proofs can be found in the appendix.
In other words, in the induced game, the buyer will always want to map a value that is in
quantile q in the true distribution to a value that is also in quantile q in the fake distribution, no
matter what the fake distribution is.
This lemma also holds for non-truthful mechanism family, since weakly decreasing x∗(q) is a
necessary condition of a BNE.
Use the same approach as Myerson’s analysis, we first prove the payment identity formula using
the quantile representation.
Lemma 3.3. (Payment identity) In a BIC mechanism M vˆ(·), suppose vˆ(·) is continuous, then
the interim allocation x∗(q) is weakly decreasing in q. Moreover, given the buyer’s quantile q, the
interim payment satisfies
t∗(q) = vˆ(q)x∗(q) +
∫ 1
r=q
x∗(r)vˆ′(r)dr − vˆ(1)x∗(1) + t∗(1) (1)
Given allocation rule x(·) ∈ Rn+ → [0, 1]n such that x∗(q) is weakly decreasing, the auctioneer
can implement (1) by choosing payment rule
t(b(q)) = b(q)x(b(q))−
∫ b(q)
z=vˆ(1)
x(z,b−i(q−i))dz, ∀q ∈ [0, 1]n (2)
Payment rule (2) satisfies −vˆ(1)x∗(1) + t∗(1) = 0
Lemma 3.3 requires the continuity and boundedness of vˆ(·), In fact, we show in appendix that
it is sufficient to only consider continuous, bounded fake distributions. So WLOG, we can make
this assumption throughout the paper.
Lemma 3.4. Given fake distribution profile vˆ(·), the expected utility of the buyer is
U =
∫ 1
0
x∗(q)(v(q)− r(q))dq + vˆ(1)x∗(1)− t∗(1) (3)
where r(q) = vˆ(q) + qvˆ′(q).
r(q) is known as the virtual value (in [19]).
Lemma 3.5. Given the fake distribution profile vˆ(·), the expected revenue is
REV =
n∑
i=1
(
∫ 1
0
x∗i (q)r(q)dq − vˆi(1)x∗i (1) + t∗i (1)) (4)
Lemma 3.5 follows directly from Lemma 3.4 and Definition 2.6.
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4 Warm-up: Prior-independent mechanism family
We first analyze the easy case where the mechanism family under consideration is independent of
priors. We show that in any such mechanism family, it is a weak dominant strategy for each buyer
to report the true distribution.
Definition 4.1. (Prior-independent mechanism family)
A mechanism family {M f(·)|f(·) ∈ Fn} is prior independent if it is truthful, and take any bid
profile b = (b1, b2, ..., bn) as input, M
f(·) returns the same outcome for any f(·).
By definition, second-price auction (SPA) is a prior-independent mechanism family, while the
Myerson auction, second-price auction with monopoly reserve price, are not.
Theorem 4.2. For any prior-independent mechanism family, it is a weakly dominant strategy
for each buyer to report the true distribution in the induced game. Moreover, the buyer’s utility
increases as vˆ(q) approaches v(q).
5 The Myerson auction
In the fake distribution setting, we show that the Myerson auction is strategically equivalent to the
first-price auction in the standard setting.
We first consider the case where we restrict the set of possible fake distributions to regular
distributions, i.e., the virtual value r(q) = vˆ(q) + qvˆ′(q) is weakly decreasing.
For each i, given buyer i’s fake distribution vˆi(·) and bid bi, define virtual bid (of buyer i) φ(bi) =
bi − 1−Gi(bi)g(bi) , where Gi is the cumulative distribution function on vˆi(·) and gi is the probability
density function.
Definition 5.1. A mechanism M f(·) in the Myerson mechanism family allocates the item to the
buyer with the largest positive virtual bid φ(b) (with respect to f(·)). (If no buyer has positive virtual
bid, the seller keeps the item). The payment rule is according to (2).
Under any regular fake distribution profile, it is a truthful mechanism family.
Fix other buyers’ fake distributions vˆ−i(·), given the quantile q, in the same spirit as the proof
of Theorem 4.2, the interim allocation only depends on the value r(q). As a result, we can write
x(r(q)) = x∗(q).
Theorem 5.2. In Myerson mechanism family, for fixed vˆ−i(·), one of the buyer’s best response of
the induced game is
vˆ(q) =
∫ q
0 r(s)ds
q
, q ∈ [0, 1]
r(q) = arg max
r(q)≥0
x(r(q))(v(q)− r(q)), q ∈ [0, 1] (5)
Furthermore, vˆ(q) is weakly monotone decreasing and regular.
Example 5.3. For the case of n = 2 and both buyers’ true distributions are i.i.d. from uniform
[0,1], i.e., v1(q) = v2(q) = 1− q. Suppose that buyer two reports the true distribution, i.e. vˆ2(q) =
1− q, so r2(q) = 1− 2q. The best response of buyer one in the induced game is vˆ1(q) = .
In this example, buyer one’s utility is 14 , greater than
1
12 , the utility buyer one gets when
reporting the true distribution.
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Example 5.4. For the case of n = 2 and both buyers’ true distributions are i.i.d. from uniform
[0,1], i.e., v1(q) = v2(q) = 1−q. Each buyer reports fake distribution vˆ(q) = 12− 14q is an equilibrium
of induced game in Myerson’s mechanism family.
For the equilibrium in Example 5.4, U1 = U2 =
1
6 , expected social welfare
SW = E[max{v1(q), v2(q)}] = 23 , revenue REV = 13 .
Compared to the Myerson auction in the standard setting: U1 = U2 =
1
12 , REV =
5
12 , SW =
7
12 ,
the equilibrium in the induced game yields higher buyer utility and social welfare, but less revenue.
As a result, it is desirable for the buyers to commit to such fake distributions.
We now prove our main theorem of the section, the equivalence between Myerson auction in
the fake distribution model and first-price auction in the standard model.
Theorem 5.5. (Main Theorem) Given v(·), the induced game of Myerson mechanism family is
strategically equivalent to the first-price auction in standard setting.
The idea for proving the theorem is to notice that, the utility formula of the induced distribution-
reporting game of Myerson (see Equation (8) in the appendix) is exactly the utility formula of a
first-price auction where each player’s action is to report a virtual value.
As a result, the two games are revenue equivalent. In other words, Myerson’s revenue in the
fake distribution setting is reduced to that of the first-price auction in the standard setting.
See again Example 5.4, it is well known that the BNE for first-price auction is b(v) = v2 for
valuation distribution uniform in [0,1]. So the virtual value of fake distribution r(q) = v(q)2 =
1−q
2 ,
same as the proof of Example 5.4.
Given this result, it is easy to prove the monotonicity of r(q). Since r(q) is the optimal bidding
strategy in the corresponding FPA, it is monotone.
All results so far extend to the case where we allow the buyers to report any, possibly irregular
fake distribution. The Myerson auction also extends the general distributions via ironing, a proce-
dure that maps the irregular distribution to a regular distribution, then run Myerson mechanism
for the ironed distributions. All our results in this section remain the same, because whenever a
buyer reports an irregular distribution, it is equivalent to report the ironed distribution instead.
6 Second-price auction with monopoly reserve
Second-price auction with monopoly reserve [15] is an auction that first rejects all the bids below
the respective monopoly reserves and run second-price auction on the remaining bids. Since we
allow buyers to report any distributions, we need to extend the definition of monopoly reserve to
the irregular case. We begin by reviewing Myerson’s ironing procedure.
Definition 6.1. (Ironing)
For any distribution f(·) ∈ F (regular or irregular) with revenue curve R(q) = qf(q). Let R(q)
denote the smallest concave function such that R(q) ≥ R(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1]. R(q) is called the
ironed revenue curve. The derivative of ironed revenue curve r(q) = R
′
(q) is the ironed virtual
value.
Given a distribution f(·), the quantile q∗ such that r(q∗) = 0 is called the reserve quantile for
distribution f(q). The value f(q∗) is called the monopoly reserve price for distribution f(q). If
there are multiple reserve quantiles, set the reserve quantile to be the largest one (i.e., the smallest
type whose virtual value is 0).
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Definition 6.2. (Second-price auction with monopoly reserve (SPAMR) mechanism family)
For any mechainism M f(·) in a SPAMR mechanism family, it first computes the monopoly
reserve price for each buyer i and then allocates the item to the buyer with the largest bid b which
is not less than the monopoly reserve price. (If no buyer satisfies this, the seller keeps the items).
The payment rule is according to (2).
Lemma 6.3. For any distribution f(q) with revenue curve R(q) = qf(q), its reserve quantile q∗
satisfies q∗ = arg maxq∈[0,1] qR(q) (breaking tie by choosing the largest quantile)
Proof. Since R(q) is convex hull of R(q), their maximum points remain the same. So arg maxR(q) =
arg maxR(q), and by definition q∗ = arg maxR(q) = arg maxR(q)
Unlike Theorem 4.2, reporting truthfully now leads to a potentially bad reserve price and thus
may no longer be a dominant strategy.
In this section, we assume that the true distributions v(·) are regular. We further consider two
cases: in this first case, the mechanism family allows buyers to report any fake distributions, while
in the second case, the mechanism family only allows buyers to report regular fake distributions.
6.1 Case one: general fake distribution
Theorem 6.4. In the induced game of SPAMR mechanism family, fix vˆ−i(·), there exists R such
that, it is WLOG to consider vˆ(·) with the following form (see the red line (line Oq1q2q3qˆ∗) in
Figure 1 in Appendix).
• for q3 ≤ q ≤ 1, vˆ(q) = R
• for q2 ≤ q < q3 or 0 ≤ q < q1, vˆ(q) = v(q)
• for q1 ≤ q < q2, vˆ(q) = Rq
Where q1v(q1) = R, q2v(q2) = R, q1 < q2, v(q3) = R.
Theorem 6.5. For any buyers’ true distributions that are i.i.d. regular with minimum support at
0 and do not have a point mass, there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium in the induced game.
6.2 Case two: regular fake distribution
Theorem 6.6. There exists a quantile q0 such that it is without generality to consider vˆ(·) with
the following form
• For all q < q0, vˆ(q) = v(q)
• For all q ≥ q0, vˆ(q) = q0v(q0)q
We call the corresponding q0 the incident quantile of the buyer.
Example 6.7. In SPAMR mechanism family, for the case where n = 2 and the buyers’ true
distribution are i.i.d. from uniform [0,1], i.e. v1(q) = v2(q) = 1 − q, then the following fake
distribution is an equilibrium of the induced game.
• for 0 ≤ q < 14 ,vˆi(q) = 1− q,
• for 14 ≤ q ≤ 1, vˆi(q) = 316q
Theorem 6.8. In SPAMR family, for the case where the buyers’ true distributions are i.i.d. regular,
the revenue yielded by the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the induced game is equal to the revenue
of the SPA under the true distribution.
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7 Second-price auction with reserves in quantile
Definition 7.1. Second-price auction with random quantile reserve (SPARQR)
Each mechanism M f(·) in the mechanism family first a random drawn qr from uniform [0, 1],
and allocate the item to the buyer with largest bid b subject to b ≥ f(qr) (If none of the buyers
satisfies the constraint, the seller keeps the items). The payment rule is derived by (2).
If the distribution f(·) does not have a point mass, the mechanism is known as the single sample
mechanism [16].
Theorem 7.2. In SPARQR mechanism family, for the case where n = 2 and buyers’ true distri-
butions are i.i.d., fake distribution vˆ(·) subject to v(q) = vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q), ∀q ∈ [0, 1] and v(1) = vˆ(1)
is weakly decreasing and is an equilibrium distribution of the induced game.
Example 7.3. In SPARQR mechanism family, for the case where n = 2 and buyers’ true distri-
butions are i.i.d. from uniform [0,1], then vˆ(q) = 1 − q + q ln q is an equilibrium of the induced
game.
Note that ln q > q−1q so vˆ(q) ≥ 0, vˆ′(q) = ln q ≤ 0, which is a feasible distribution.
Theorem 7.4. In the SPARQR mechanism family, if n buyers’ true distributions are i.i.d., the
revenue under the equilibrium of the induced game is no more than the revenue of second price
auction under the true distribution.
8 Virtual efficient mechanism family
Most auction family in the single-item case can be regarded as a comparison of specific “virtual
value” [4], in which each mechanism allocates the item to the buyers with the largest “virtual
value” and the payments are set according to (2). Here, the “virtual value” is defined with respect
to a buyer’s fake distribution. In this section, we consider a class of truthful mechanism family in
which the “virtual value” R can be written as a simple functional of the fake distribution vˆ(q), i.e.,
R = R(q, vˆ(q), vˆ′(q)).
For the buyer with fake distribution vˆ(q), in the value space, we define R equivalently, i.e.,
R(v) = R(v,G, g), where G is the cumulative distribution function on vˆ(q) and g is the probability
density function. Given a bid b, let R(b) denote the “virtual bid” .
Definition 8.1. In a virtual efficient mechanism family (VE), each mechanism allocate the item
to the buyers with the largest “virtual bid” R(b). The payment rule is set according to (2).
Note the Myerson mechanism and second-price with monopoly reserve are not included in this
definition, since both auctions use the ironed virtual value r(q), which can not be written as a
simple functional for irregular fake distributions.
Lemma 8.2. For a truthful VE mechanism family, ∂R∂vˆ′(q) = 0,
∂R
∂q ≤ 0, ∂R∂vˆ(q) ≥ 0.
Lemma 8.3. For a truthful, VE mechanism family, in the i.i.d. case, if there exists a symmetric
equilibrium, then the fake distribution vˆ(·) in equilibrium satisfies vˆ(q) ≤ v(q) for any q.
Theorem 8.4. If the buyers’ true distributions are i.i.d., the revenue of any VE family under the
equilibrium of induced game is no more than the revenue of second-price auction under the true
distributions.
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APPENDIX
A Missing proofs from section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.2. By definition, the buyer’s utility in the induced game is U =
∫ 1
0 (x
∗(q)v(φ(q))−
t∗(q))dq. When the buyers’ fake distributions are given, x∗(q) and t∗(q) are constants.
By the property of BIC, we have that x∗(q) is decreasing in q. Since φ(q) is a mapping over
[0, 1], by the Rearrangement Inequality, we have∫ 1
0
x∗(q)v(φ(q))dq ≤
∫ 1
0
x∗(q)v(q)dq
When the mapping is φ(q) = q, the utility is U ′ =
∫ 1
0 (x
∗(q)v(q)− t∗(q))dq, so U ≤ U ′
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For any q′ < q, by BIC we have,
x∗(q)vˆ(q)− t∗(q) ≥ x∗(q′)vˆ(q)− t∗(q′) (6)
x∗(q′)vˆ(q′)− t∗(q′) ≥ x∗(q)vˆ(q′)− t∗(q) (7)
(6)+(7) we get
(x∗(q′)− x∗(q))(vˆ(q′)− vˆ(q)) ≥ 0.
Since vˆ(q′) ≥ vˆ(q), x∗(q′) ≥ x∗(q), so x∗(q) is monotone decreasing.
For second part, we define u(q) = x∗(q)vˆ(q)− t∗(q), (6) becomes
u(q′)− u(q) ≤ x∗(q′)(vˆ(q′)− vˆ(q))
(7) becomes
u(q′)− u(q) ≥ x∗(q)(vˆ(q′)− vˆ(q)),
so
x∗(q)(vˆ(q′)− vˆ(q)) ≤ u(q′)− u(q) ≤ x∗(q′)(vˆ(q′)− vˆ(q))
substitute q′ by q + , and let → 0, we get
u′(q) = −x∗(q)vˆ′(q)
Integrate over q we have u(q) = − ∫ 1r=q x∗(r)vˆ′(r)dr + u(1)
So we have t∗(q) = vˆ(q)x∗(q) +
∫ 1
r=q x
∗(r)vˆ′(r)dr − vˆ(1)x∗(1) + t∗(1)
Proof of Lemma 3.4. By Definition 2.5 and Lemma 3.3
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U =
∫ 1
0
(x∗(q)v(q)− t∗(q))dq
= vˆ(1)x∗(1)− t∗(1) +
∫ 1
0
(v(q)x∗(q)− x∗(q)vˆ(q))dq −
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
q
x∗(r)vˆ′(r)drdq
= vˆ(1)x∗(1)− t∗(1) +
∫ 1
0
x∗(q)(v(q)− vˆ(q))dq −
∫ 1
0
∫ r
0
x∗(r)vˆ′(r)dqdr
= vˆ(1)x∗(1)− t∗(1) +
∫ 1
0
x∗(q)(v(q)− vˆ(q))dq −
∫ 1
0
qx∗(q)vˆ′(q)dq
= vˆ(1)x∗(1)− t∗(1) +
∫ 1
0
x∗(q)(v(q)− vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q))dq
= vˆ(1)x∗(1)− t∗(1) +
∫ 1
0
x∗(q)(v(q)− r(q))dq
For discontinuous or unbounded cases, we have the following:
Lemma A.1. For any auctions considered in this payer, all results for any discontinuous or un-
bounded distribution are limitations of series of continuous and bounded distribution.
Proof. For any fake distribution vˆ(·), consider the following distribution f(·):
w.p. 1− , f(q) = vˆ(q)
w.p. , f is a [vˆ(1), vˆ(0)] uniform distribution.
Then f is a continuous function that as → 0, f → vˆ(q).
For any unbounded distributions, it can be approached by taking its truncations at higher and
higher values. The truncate distribution is bounded.
All our results for unbounded or discontinues are approached arbitrarily well by the series of
continuous and bounded distribution.
B Missing proofs from section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Fix other buyers’ reports vˆ−i(·) and the quantile q of buyer i. By definition
of prior-independent mechanism family, the interim allocation x∗(q) only depends on the value of
vˆ(·) at quantile q, regardless the whole fake distribution vˆ(·). We write x(vˆ(q)) = x∗(q) to reflect
this observation.
By Lemma 3.3, the buyer’s interim utility
u∗(q) = v(q)x(vˆ(q))− vˆ(q)x(vˆ(q)) +
∫ vˆ(q)
0
x(z)dz
Note that the term is independent to any other the value vˆ(q′) such that q′ 6= q, so we can
maximize
∫ 1
0 u
∗(r)dr case by case for each r ∈ [0, 1]
Define x′(v) = dxdv . We have
du∗(q)
dvˆ
= x′(vˆ(q))(v(q)− vˆ(q))
Since x′(vˆ(q)) ≥ 0, u∗i (q) is maximized at vˆ(q) = v(q). So the buyer will always want to report
vˆ(q) = v(q) at quantile q. In addition, the buyer’s utility increases as vˆ(q) approaches v(q).
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C Missing proofs from section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.2. For fixed vˆ−i(·), by Lemma 3.4, the buyer’s best response vˆ(q) maximizes∫ 1
0
x(r(q))(v(q)− r(q))dq. (8)
Define F (q) = x(r(q))(v(q) − r(q)). The problem becomes to find a r(·) that maximizes∫ 1
0 F (q)dq. We maximize F (q) case by case for each q ∈ [0, 1]. For any q, the solution is
r(q) = arg maxr(q)≥0 x(r(q))(v(q)− r(q)), q ∈ [0, 1].
In particular,
vˆ(q) =
x(r(q))
x′(r(q))
+ r(q),
if x(r(q))x′(r(q)) + r(q) ≥ 0, where x′(r) = dxdr .
Given such r(q), we solve the differential equation r(q) = vˆ(q) + qvˆ′(q),q ∈ [0, 1] to get vˆ(q).
One of the solutions is
vˆ(q) =
∫ q
0 r(s)ds
q
.
In order to ensure that such vˆ(q) is a distribution and is regular, we need to show the mono-
tonicity of vˆ(q) and r(q). To prove the monotonicity of r(q), for any q′ < q, by definition of
r(q):
x(r(q))(v(q)− r(q)) ≥ x(r(q′))(v(q)− r(q′))
x(r(q′))(v(q′)− r(q′)) ≥ x(r(q))(v(q′)− r(q))
Add them together we have
(x(r(q))− x(r(q′)))(v(q)− v(q′)) ≥ 0
Since v(q) ≤ v(q′), by the monotonicity of x(r), we get r(q) ≤ r(q′).
Given the monotonicity of r(q), note that
vˆ(q) =
∫ q
0 r(s)ds
q
≥
∫ q
0 r(q)ds
q
=
qr(q)
q
= r(q)
And by r(q) = vˆ(q) + qvˆ′(q) we get vˆ′(q) < 0.
Proof of Example 5.3. For buyer one’s quantile q, F1(q) in (8) is
r1(q)+1
2 (v1(q)− r1(q)),
The optimal non-negative r1(q) to maximize F1(q) is r1(q) = 0, for all q ∈ [0, 1].
So the buyer 1’s best response in the is vˆ1(q) =  (meanwhile, r(q) =  ). Note that r2(q) < 0
when q ∈ (12 , 1]. Let → 0, buyer 1 guarantees a constant allocation probability x∗1(q) = 12 for any
q, with the payment tends to 0.
Proof of Example 5.4. Given the other buyer’s fake distribution vˆ−i(q) = 12− 14q, so the correspond-
ing virtual value curve r−i(q) = 1−q2 . So x(r(q)) = Prq∈[0,1][
1−q
2 ≤ r(q)] = 2r(q). By (8), buyer i’s
utility is ∫ 1
0
2r(q)(v(q)− r(q))
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Fix q, 2r(q)(v(q)− r(q)) get its maximum if r(q) = v(q)2 = 1−q2
Solving the differential equation vˆ(q) + qvˆ′(q) = 1−q2 we get the solution vˆ(q) =
1
2 − 14q
In the rest of this section, we give the proof of Theorem 5.5
Note that the utility of Myerson mechanism family only depends on the virtual value function
r(·), i.e., for a set of fake distributions that corresponding to a same virtual value function, (the
differential function vˆ(q) + qvˆ′(q) = r(q) has multiple solutions of vˆ(q)), the buyer has the same
utility. So we can simplify the buyer’s action to reporting the virtual value function r(q), instead
of reporting the fake distribution vˆ(q).
To describe the main theorem of this section, we first rewrite the induced game of Myerson
mechanism family in an equivalent way as follows:
Definition C.1. The induced game of Myerson mechanism family given true distribution profile
v(·) is a normal-form game (N,A,U) where
• N = {1, ..., n} buyers, indexed by i.
• A = A1 × A2...× An, where A1 = A2 = ... = An = F . We use ri(·) ∈ F to denote an action
of buyer i, in other words, the action of buyer i is to choose a virtual value distribution.
• U = {U1, ..., Un}, where Ui : A→ R denote the utility function of buyer i such that (from 8)
Ui(r1(·), r2(·), ..., rn(·)) =
∫ 1
0
(
∫
q−i
xMi (r(q))dq−i)(vi(qi)− ri(qi))dqi
where xM is the allocation vector in Myerson mechanism, taking n buyers’ virtual values as
inputs.
Consider a standard first-price auction (FPA) with type distribution profile v(·), which is a
Bayesian game. The buyer’s bidding strategy is a function b(q) : [0, 1] → R that maps each
quantile (equivalently, value) to bid.
Lemma C.2. In first-price auction, given buyers’ bidding strategy profile b(·), buyer i’s expected
utility is ∫ 1
0
(
∫
q−i
xFi (b(q))dq−i)(vi(qi)− bi(qi))dqi
where xF is the allocation vector in first-price auction, given n bids as inputs.
Proof. In FPA, for a fixed quantile profile q, the buyer pays his/her bid if he/she get the item, and
pay 0 otherwise, so the utility is xFi (b(q))(vi(qi)− bi(qi)). As an result, the expected utility is∫
q
xFi (b(q))(vi(qi)− bi(qi))dq =
∫ 1
0
(
∫
q−i
xFi (b(q))dq−i)(vi(qi)− bi(qi))dqi
In th same spirit as we defined for induced game of Myerson mechanism family, we can regard
the first-price auction as a normal-form game, where each player’s action is simply choosing a
bidding strategy, and the utility is the expected utility defined above. Formally,
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Definition C.3. The induced game of first-price auction given type distribution profile v(·) is
normal-form game (N,A,U) where
• N = {1, ..., n} buyers, indexed by i
• A = A1 × A2...× An, where A1 = A2 = ... = An = F . We use bi(·) ∈ F to denote an action
of buyer i, in other words, the action of buyer i is to choose a bidding strategy.
• U = {U1, ..., Un}, where Ui : A→ R denotes the utility function of buyer i such that
Ui(b1(·), b2(·), ..., bn(·)) =
∫ 1
0
(
∫
q−i
xFi (b(q))dq−i)(vi(qi)− bi(qi))dqi
It is natural to only consider decreasing bidding strategy in FPA, since it is not hard to show
that any non-decreasing bidding strategy is weakly dominated by a decreasing bidding strategy.
Theorem C.4. Given v(·), the induced game of Myerson mechanism family (N,Fn, U1) is identical
to the induced game of FPA (N,Fn, U2).
Proof of Theorem C.4. To verify that U1 and U2 are the same function, we need to prove that
given the same input, i.e, b(·) = r(·), we have U1(b(·)) = U2(r(·)).
In fact, x∗F and x
∗
M are exactly the same function: Given a quantile profile q, FPA allocates
the item to the buyer with the largest bid b(q), and the Myerson mechanism allocates the item to
the buyer with the largest virtual value r(q). As b(·) = r(·), the two utilities are indeed the same.
This proves the theorem.
D Missing proofs from section 6
Fix vˆ−i(·) and the reserve price of vˆ(·), given the quantile q for the buyer, following a similar
argument as before, the interim allocation only depends on the value of vˆ(q). We write x∗(q) =
x(vˆ(q)).
D.1 Missing proofs from section 6.1
First let q∗ denote the reserve quantile of v(·) (where the revenue curve qv(q) get its maximum),
and define R∗ = q∗v(q∗). q∗ and R∗ are constants given the true distribution. Let qˆ∗ denote the
reserve quantile of vˆ(·), and define R = qˆ∗vˆ(qˆ∗). qˆ∗ and R are to be determined.
To prove Theorem 6.4 and 6.5, we introduce following lemmas:
Lemma D.1. Subject to qˆ∗, R unchange, the buyer’s utility weakly increases as vˆ(·) approaches
v(·).
Note that by Lemma 6.3, the reserve price vˆ(q∗) = Rqˆ∗ is also fixed. Directly from the proof of
Theorem 4.2, u∗(q) increases for all q < q∗, as vˆ(q) approaches v(q). So the buyer’s utility also
increases.
Lemma D.2. It is without loss of generality to consider vˆ(·) subject to R ≤ R∗.
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Proof. Suppose R > R∗ = v(q∗)q∗. We change the distribution vˆ(·) as follows: for all q < qˆ∗ such
that qvˆ(q) > R∗, set vˆ(q) = R
∗
q . After the change, every vˆ(q) get closer to v(q) and the reserve price
decreases. (Note that after the change the reserve quantile qˆ∗ remains the same.) By Theorem 4.2,
each interim utility u∗(q) increases for all q < q∗. Since for q > q∗, the utility is always 0, we can
conclude that the overall utility increases.
So we only need to consider the case where R ≤ R∗. Since v(·) is a regular distribution, qv(q)
is concave with q. Let q1, q2 denote the two intersection points between revenue curve qv(q) and
straight line y = R. (If R = R∗, set q1 = q2. If v(1) > R, set q2 = 1). It’s easy to see that it is
not optimal when qˆ∗ < q2. Let q3 denote the quantile of the intersection between revenue curve
y = qv(q) and straight line ((0, 0), (qˆ∗, R)). If v(1) > R, set q3 = 1, otherwise q3 always exists and
q2 < q3 < 1.
Lemma D.3. For fixed R subject to R ≤ R∗ and fixed reserve quantile qˆ∗, it is without loss of
generality to consider vˆ(·) with the following form.
• For q s.t. qˆ∗ < q < 1, vˆ(q) can be any value less than Rq∗ ,
• For q s.t. q3 < q < q∗, vˆ(q) = Rqˆ∗ (constant),
• For q s.t. q2 < q < q3 or 0 < q < q1, vˆ(q) = v(q) (truthful)
• For q s.t. q1 < q < q2, vˆ(q) = Rv (q) (equal revenue curve)
(the revenue curve of vˆ(q) is the red line (line Oq1q2q3qˆ
∗) in Figure 1.
Proof. Given R and qˆ∗ fixed, the feasible domain of vˆ(q) is [ Rqˆ∗ ,
R
q ], i.e. the revenue curve qvˆ(q) in
figure 1 should below the line y = R and above the line ((0, 0), (qˆ∗, R)). Then by Lemma D.1 we
should choose the value in the feasible region that is the closest to v(q), so the revenue curve of the
best response distribution is the red line (line Oq1q2q3qˆ
∗).
Figure 1: Best response to SPA with Myerson reserve
Lemma D.4. For fixed R, and suppose vˆ(q) has the form in Lemma D.3, it is without loss of
generality to set qˆ∗ = 1.
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Proof. By Lemma D.3 we assume w.l.o.g. that R < R∗. q1, q2, q3 are define in Figure 1. We have
q3
qˆ∗ =
q3v(q3)
R . Then qˆ
∗ = Rv(q3) , which is uniquely determined by q3.
U =
∫ q1
0
x(v(q))(−qv′(q))dq +
∫ q2
q1
x(
R
q
)v(q)dq
+
∫ q3
q2
x(v(q))(−qv′(q))dq +
∫ R
v(q3)
q3
x(v(q3)(v(q)− v(q3)))dq
We compute the derivative of U to q3
U ′ = −x(v(q3))q3v′(q3) +
∫ R
v(q3)
q3
(x′(v(q3))v′(q3)(v(q)− v(q3))
−v′(q3)x(v(q3)))dq − Rv
′(q3)
v2(q3)
x(v(q3))(v(
R
v(q3)
)− v(q3))
U ′
v′(q3)
= −q3x(v(q3)) +
∫ R
v(q3)
q3
(x′(v(q3))(v(q)− v(q3))− x(v(q3)))dq −
R
v2(q3)
x(v(q3))(v(
R
v(q3)
)− v(q3))
≤ −q3x(v(q3))− x(v(q3))( R
v(q3)
− q3)− R
v2(q3)
x(v(q3))(v(
R
v(q3)
)− v(q3))
U ′
v′(q3)x(v(q3))
≤ − R
v(q3)
− R
v2(q3)
(v(
R
v(q3)
)− v(q3))
U ′v(q3)
v′(q3)x(v(q3))R
≤ −1−
v( Rv(q3))− v(q3)
v(q3)
= −
v( Rv(q3))
v(q3)
< 0
(The first inequality holds because x′(v) > 0 for any v and v(q) < v(q3) for q ∈ [q3, Rv(q3) ])
So we can conclude that U ′ > 0 since v′(q3) < 0 and other terms in left side are non-negative.
qˆ∗ = 1 when q3 gets its feasible maximum.
So Theorem 6.4 is proved.
Lemma D.5. For fixed R, the buyer’s utility by reporting the best response distribution described
in Lemmas D.3 and D.4 is given by,
U =
∫ q1
0
x(v(q))(−qv′(q))dq +
∫ q2
q1
x(
R
q
)v(q)dq +
∫ q3
q2
x(v(q))(−qv′(q)) +
∫ 1
q3
x(R)(v(q)−R)dq
where q1v(q1) = R, q2(q2) = R, v(q3) = R.
Lemma D.6. For any buyers’ true distributions that are i.i.d. regular , if v(1) = 0 and the best
response given by Lemma D.3 and D.4 is unique, then there does not exist a symmetric equilibrium
of fake distribution.
Proof. v(1) = 0 implies that q2, q3 < 1. Assume by contradiction that if there exists a symmetric
equilibrium, we use vˆ(q) to denote the fake distribution in equilibrium. By Lemma D.3 and D.4,
the equilibrium of fake distribution have a point mass on [q3, 1], where all buyers’ fake types are
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equal to the reserve price vˆ(1) = R. The mechanism must deal with tie-breaking in this case. Note
that when q ∈ [q3, 1], this part of utility is
∫ 1
q3
x(R)(v(q) − R)dq < 0. So, to maximize utility, the
buyer wants to minimize x(R). Whatever the tie breaking rule is, all buyers can always deviate by
using R −  instead of R. The first three terms in Lemma D.5 will vary by an infinitesimal, while
in the last term, x(R) vary from a negative non-infinitesimal to 0, and the whole term will increase
by a non-infinitesimal amount. So it is not an equilibrium, unless all vˆ(q) equal 0. But it’s easy to
check that vˆ(q) = 0 is not an equilibrium either. Contradiction.
It remains to show that the best response of fake distribution is unique. We have following
lemmas.
Lemma D.7. For any buyers’ true distributions that are i.i.d. regular and do not have a point
mass, the symmetric equilibrium of fake distribution can not have a point mass.
Lemma D.8. For any buyers’ true distributions that are i.i.d. regular and do not have a point
mass, if there exists a symmetric equilibrium of best response of fake distribution with fixed R and
reserve quantile qˆ∗, then the best response of fake distribution given by Lemma D.3 is unique.
Theorem 6.5 then follows from Lemmas D.7 and D.8.
Proof of Lemma D.7 and D.8. We first assume by contradiction that there is a point mass on equi-
librium of fake distribution, i.e. vˆ(q) = c for q ∈ [a, b], a < b.
Since v(q) does not have a point mass, there exist a subinterval [x, y] s.t. v(q) > c, ∀q ∈ [x, y]
or v(q) < c, ∀q ∈ [c, d].
We consider case by case. If v(q) > c,∀q ∈ [x, y], one can deviate the fake distribution by
vˆ(q) = c+ −  q−xy−x , ∀q ∈ [x, y] (slightly adjust the value in the left-neighborhood of x to keep the
monotonicity). This slight disturb remains max qvˆ(q) and arg max qvˆ(q) the same, and note that
since there is a tie breaking rule for q ∈ [x, y], it gives a non-infinitesimal increasing to the utility.
If v(q) < c, ∀q ∈ [x, y], for cases arg max qvˆ(q) 6= y, one can deviate the fake distribution by
vˆ(q) = c −  (slightly adjust the value in the neighborhood of endpoints x, y to keep the mono-
tonicity). And for case arg max qvˆ(q) = y, one can deviate by setting R = R −  and according to
Lemma D.6. All these slight disturb gives a non-infinitesimal increasing to the utility.
To show Lemma D.8, fix max qvˆ(q) and arg max qvˆ(q). Assume by contradiction that in sym-
metric equilibrium there exists a fake distribution vˆ(q) that does not consistent to the distribution
we give in Lemma D.3 (denote by vˆ∗(q)) but give the same utility. Suppose that vˆ∗(q) 6= vˆ(q)
for a given quantile q, by Lemma D.1 and Theorem 4.2, we can infer that x(vˆ(q)) = x(vˆ∗(q)) =
Constant,∀v ∈ [vˆ∗(q), vˆ(q)]. However, since there is no point mass, in symmetric equilibrium
x(vˆ(q)) = q, i.e., no constant allocation in any interval, contradiction.
Combining Lemma D.3, Lemma D.7 and Lemma D.8, we conclude that in symmetric environ-
ment there is no equilibrium of fake distribution. Nevertheless, Lemma D.4 can be used to solve
equilibriums in asymmetric cases.
D.2 Missing proofs from section 6.2
In this setting, the revenue curve of fake distribution is a concave function. Let qˆ∗ denote the
reserve quantile (where the qvˆ(q) is maximized), then from 0 to qˆ∗, qvˆ(q) is weakly increasing.
Define R = qˆ∗vˆ(qˆ∗).
Lemma D.9. It is without loss of generality to consider vˆ(·) subject to qˆ∗ = 1.
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Proof. If qˆ∗ < 1, set vˆ(q) = Rq for all q ∈ [qˆ∗, 1]. The utility increases by
∫ 1
qˆ∗ x(
R
q )v(q)dq > 0. So
qˆ∗ = 1
Proof of Theorem 6.6. First of all, by a similar argument as in Lemma D.2, we have R ≤ R∗.
By Lemma D.9, we can assume WLOG that qˆ∗ = 1. So the revenue curve qvˆ(q) is monotone
increasing in [0,1]. Let q2 denote the quantile of the intersection between qvˆ(q) and the right part
of revenue curve qv(q) (q ∈ [q∗, 1]). If q2 does not exist (i.e. v(1) > vˆ(1)), set q2 = 1.
For all q ∈ [0, q2], since qvˆ(q) is increasing, vˆ(q) ≤ q2vˆ(q2)q . By Theorem 4.2, vˆ(q) should be
the value in this region that is the closest to v(q), i.e. qˆ = min{ q2vˆ(q2)q , v(q)}. Let q1 denote the
quantile of the intersection between straight line y = q2vˆ(q2) and the left part of revenue curve
qv(q), q ∈ [0, q∗]. So vˆ(q) = v(q) for q ∈ [0, q1] and vˆ(q) = q2vˆ(q2)q for q ∈ [q1, q2].
For q ∈ [q2, 1], set vˆ(q) = q2vˆ(q2)q , which is the minimum possible value of revenue curve. After
this change, the reserve price vˆ(1) weakly decreases, and all vˆ(q) gets closer to v(q). By Theorem
4.2 the total utility increases.
To sum up, the fake distribution vˆ(·) has the form in the Theorem 6.14, and satisfies concavity
and monotonicity.
When the buyer fixes the incident quantile, the best response of fake distribution is determined.
For each buyer i, let qi denote the incident quantile.
Lemma D.10. Buyer i’s utility of reporting the best response in Lemma Theorem 6.6 is
Ui =
∫ qi
0
x(v(q))(−qv′(q))dq +
∫ 1
qi
x(v(
qiv(qi)
q
))v(q)dq
In an equilibrium of the induced game, dU1q1 =
dU2
q2
= ... = dUnqn = 0
Lemma D.11. Suppose n = 2 and true distributions are i.i.d. regular, for symmetric equilibrium
of the induced game, the incident quantile q0 (identical to both buyers) satisfies
q0 − 1 + 1
q0v(q0)
∫ 1
q0
qv(q)dq = 0
Proof. Consider the derivative of U to q0.
dU
dq0
= x(v(q0))(−q0v′(q0)) +
∫ 1
q0
v(q)dx(v( q0v(q0)q ))
dq0
dq − x(v(q0))v(q0) (9)
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium, x(v) = 1− v−1−i (v) = 1− q, and x′(v) , dxdv = − 1v′(q) . Define
r(q) = v(q) + qv′(q). For q ∈ [q0, 1]
dx(v( q0v(q0)q ))
dq0
=
dx
dv
dv
d( q0v(q0)q )
d( q0v(q0)q )
dq0
= − 1
v′(q)
dv
dq
dq
d( q0v(q0)q )
r(q0)
q
=
q2
q0v(q0)
r(q0)
q
=
qr(q0)
q0v(q0)
So
dU
r(q)dq0
= −x(v(q0)) +
∫ 1
q0
qv(q)
q0v(q0)
dq = q0 − 1 + 1
q0v(q0)
∫ 1
q0
qv(q)dq
Let the formula above be 0 concludes the proof.
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Proof of Example 6.7. By Lemma D.11, we have q0 − 1 + 1q0(1−q0)(16 − 12q20 + 13q30) = 0
Solving this equation we get q0 =
1
4 .
The revenue in the example is REV = 2
∫ 1
4
0 (1− q)(1− 2q)dq = 13
Compared to SPA in the standard setting, buyer’s utility and social welfare increase, while the
revenue remains the same. This is not a coincidence. In the following, we prove Theorem 6.8 that
says for i.i.d., regular true distributions, the revenue of the equilibrium in SPAMR equals to the
revenue of SPA in standard setting.
Proof of Theorem 6.8. For simplicity here we only prove the case when n = 2.
By Theorem 6.6 and Lemma 3.5
REV = 2
∫ q0
0
(1− q)(v(q) + qv′(q))dq = 2
∫ q0
0
(1− q)d(qv(q))
= 2q0(1− q0)v(q0) + 2
∫ q0
0
qv(q)dq
By Lemma 6.18, we have (1−q0)q0v(q0) =
∫ 1
q0
qv(q)dq Combine together we get REV = 2
∫ 1
0 qv(q)dq
Note that the revenue of second-price auction is
REV2 = 2
∫ 1
0
(v(q) + qv′(q))dq = 2
∫ 1
0
qv(q)dq,
So REV = REV2
This lemma holds for the n i.i.d. buyers case, which says that:
Lemma D.12. For n buyers with i.i.d. regular true type distribution, the revenue of second-
price with Myerson’s reserve mechanism family on equilibrium of fake distribution (regular fake
distribution only) equal to that of the second-price auction.
Proof. Using the same notations as Lemma D.11. In this case,
x∗(q) = (1− v−1( q0vq0q ))n−1, so
dx
dq0
= (n− 1)(1− q)n−2 dq
d( q0v(q0)q )
d( q0v(q0)q )
dq0
= (n− 1)(1− q)n−2 q
2
q0v(q0)
r(q0)
q
= (n− 1)(1− q)n−2 qr(q0)
q0v(q0)
Substituting this into (9) and let dUdq0 = 0 we get
(1− q0)n−1 =
∫ 1
q0
(n− 1)(1− q)n−2qv(q)
q0v(q0)
dq
The revenue
REV = n
∫ q0
0
(1− q)n−1(v(q) + qv′(q))dq
= nq0v(q0)(1− q0)n−1 − n
∫ q0
0
(n− 1)(1− q)n−2qv(q)dq
= n
∫ 1
0
(n− 1)(1− q)n−2qv(q)dq = REV2
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E Missing proofs form section 7
Fix vˆ−i(·), for any realized value of qr, as long as q ≥ qr, for the same reason as before, we can
write x∗(q) = x(vˆ(q)), or x∗(q) = 0 if q < qr.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. When the reserve quantile is qr, by definition, the buyer utility is
∫ qr
0 x(vˆ(q))(v(q)−
vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q))dq, so the expected utility is
U =
∫ 1
0
∫ qr
0
x(vˆ(q))(v(q)− vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q))dqdqr
=
∫ 1
0
dq
∫ 1
q
x(vˆ(q))(v(q)− vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q))dqr
=
∫ 1
0
(1− q)x(vˆ(q))(v(q)− vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q))dq
This is a functional optimization problem. Define F = (1− q)x(vˆ(q))(v(q)− vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q)). The
Euler-Lagrange equation yields
∂F
∂vˆ
− d
dq
∂F
∂vˆ′
= 0
(Sometimes we omit the independent variables in differential functions)
Define x′(vˆ) = dxdvˆ = − 1v′−i(vˆ−1−i (vˆ)) , for n = 2 and in symmetric equilibrium x
′(vˆ) = − 1vˆ′(q) . We
get
x′(vˆ)(1− q)(v − vˆ − qvˆ′)− (1− q)x(vˆ) + x′(vˆ)vˆ′q(1− q) + x(vˆ)(1− 2q) = 0
By simplification we have
v(q) = vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q)
Set a particular solution vˆ(1) = v(1) we can get the solution of the differential equation.
To show the monotonicity of vˆ(·), taking the derivative of v(q) = vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q) we have v′(q) =
−vˆ′′(q), so vˆ′′(q) ≥ 0.
Set q = 1 we have v(1) = vˆ(1)− vˆ′(1), so vˆ′(1) = 0, combining with vˆ′′(q) ≥ 0 we get v′(q) ≤ 0. So
vˆ(q) is a well defined distribution.
Actually, this is functional maximization problem in which both endpoints vˆ(0), vˆ(1) are vari-
ables. So the function vˆ(q) need to satisfy the natural boundary condition:
∂F
∂vˆ′
|q=0,1 = 0
It is automatically satisfied.
As a result, when all buyers’ fake distributions satisfy v(q) = vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q), it is an equilibrium.
Since vˆ(·) is feasible, and satisfy the Euler-equation and natural boundary condition.
Proof of Theorem 7.4. We first prove the case of n = 2.
In SPARQR, the revenue from one buyer is,
REV =
∫ 1
0
(1− q)x(vˆ)(vˆ + qvˆ′(q))dq =
∫ 1
0
(1− q)2d(qvˆ(q))
=
∫ 1
0
qvˆ(q)d(1− q)2 =
∫ 1
0
2q(1− q)vˆ(q)dq
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The revenue from one buyer in second-price auction is
REV2 =
∫ 1
0
(1− q)(v(q) + qv′(q))dq =
∫ 1
0
(1− q)d(qv(q))
=
∫ 1
0
qv(q)dq =
∫ 1
0
(qvˆ(q)− q2vˆ′(q))dq
=
∫ 1
0
qvˆ(q)dq −
∫
q2dvˆ =
∫ 1
0
qvˆ(q)dq − q2vˆ(q)|10 +
∫ 1
0
2qvˆ(q)dq
=
∫ 1
0
3qvˆ(q)dq − vˆ(1)
So
REV2 −REV =
∫ 1
0
(q + 2q2)vˆ(q)dq − vˆ(1) =
∫ 1
0
vˆ(q)d(
1
2
q2 +
2
3
q3)− vˆ(1)
=
1
6
vˆ(1)−
∫ 1
0
(
1
2
q2 +
2
3
q3)vˆ′(q)dq ≥ 0
For cases where n > 2:
Lemma E.1. For n buyers with i.i.d. true type distribution, the revenue of single sample mecha-
nism family on equilibrium of fake distribution is no more than the revenue of the SPA under the
true distribution.
Proof. Using the same notations as Theorem 7.4. , In this case,
x∗(v) = (1− v(q)−1(v))n−1 = (1− q)n, x′(v) = − 1v′(q)(n− 1)(1− q)n−2
The solution of Euler equation gives
v = − qvˆ
′
n− 1 + vˆ (10)
Set the particular solution vˆ(1) = v(1), then we get the solution vˆ(·).
Then we show the monotonicity of vˆ(·). Assume by contradiction that there exists a q1 s.t.
v′(q1) < 0. From (10) we have vˆ(q1) > v(q1).
Consider the first minimum quantile q2 ∈ (q1, 1) s.t. vˆ(q2) ≤ v(q2), since vˆ(1) = v(1) q2 must
exists. Then for all q ∈ (q1, q2), by (10) vˆ′(q) > 0. So vˆ(q2) > vˆ(q1). Therefore v(q2) ≥ vˆ(q2) >
vˆ(q1) > v(q1), it contradicts with the decreasing monotonicity of v(·).
So we proved that vˆ(·) is the feasible solution (Note that the nature boundary condition is
automatically satisfied).
REV =
∫ 1
0
(1− q)x(vˆ)(vˆ(q) + qvˆ′(q)) =
∫ 1
0
(1− q)nd(qvˆ(q)) = qvˆ(q)n(1− q)n−1dq
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REV2 =
∫ 1
0
qx(v(q))(v(q) + qv′(q))dq =
∫ 1
0
q(1− q)n−1d(qv(q))
=
∫ 1
0
(n− 1)q(1− q)n−2v(q)dq
=
∫ 1
0
(−q(1− q)n−2vˆ′(q) + q(1− q)n−2(n− 1)vˆ(q))dq
=
∫ 1
0
vˆ(q)(−q2(n− 2)(1− q)n−3 + 2q(1− q)n−2 + q(1− q)n−2(n− 1))dq
Therefore, when n >= 3,
REV2 −REV
=
∫ 1
0
vˆ(q)(1− q)n−3(−q2(n− 2) + 2q(1− q) + q(1− q)(n− 1)− nq(1− q)2)dq
=
∫ 1
0
vˆ(q)(1− q)n−3(q + q2 − nq3)dq
Define F (q) = (1− q)n−3(q+ q2 − nq3) Note that for q <
√
1+4n−1
2n , F (q) > 0 and when
√
1+4n−1
2n <
q < 1, F (q) < 0. Define q∗ =
√
1+4n−1
2n , by the monotonicity of vˆ(q), we have∫ 1
0
F (q)vˆ(q)dq =
∫ q∗
0
F (q)vˆ(q) +
∫ 1
q∗
F (q)vˆ(q)
≥
∫ q∗
0
vˆ(q∗)F (q)dq +
∫ 1
q∗
vˆ(q∗)F (q)dq = vˆ(q∗)
∫ 1
0
F (q)dq
So it is remain to show that
∫ 1
0 F (q) ≥ 0, actually,∫ 1
0
F (q) =
1
n
− 1
n+ 1
> 0
So the Lemma is proved. Noth that as n → ∞ fake distribution vˆ → v(q) and the revenue
difference approaching to 0.
F Missing proofs from section 8
Proof of Lemma 8.2. Since the mechanism family is truthful, for any fake distribution vˆ(·), the
allocation rule is monotone. Then dRdq ≤ 0 for any decreasing function vˆ(·), so for any q ∈ [0, 1]
dR(q, vˆ(q), vˆ′(q))
dq
=
∂R
∂q
+
∂R
∂vˆ
vˆ′(q) +
∂R
∂vˆ′
vˆ′′(q) ≤ 0 (11)
For any given q, vˆ(q), vˆ′(q), if ∂R∂vˆ′ 6= 0, set vˆ′′(q) to be a sufficiently large value (for positive ∂R∂vˆ′ )
or sufficiently small (for negative ∂R∂vˆ′ ), then the left side of (11) is positive, contradiction.
So ∂R∂vˆ′ = 0. Given this, for any given q, vˆ(q), set vˆ
′(q) = 0, from (11) we get ∂R∂q ≤ 0. Set vˆ′(q)
sufficiently small, we get ∂R∂vˆ(q) ≥ 0.
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Fix the other buyer’s fake distribution, given quantile q, the interim allocation can be written
as a function of R, and by Lemma 8.2, x∗(q) = x(R(q, vˆ(q)))
Proof of Lemma 8.3. Consider a buyer with true type distribution v(·). Fix the other buyer’s fake
distribution, given quantile q, his interim allocation can be written as a function of R, and by
Lemma 8.2, x∗(q) = x(R(q, vˆ(q))).
By the definition and Lemma 8.2, the buyer’s utility is
U =
∫ 1
0
x(R(q, vˆ(q)))(v(q)− vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q))
We regard this as a functional of vˆ(·) and define functional F = x(R(q, vˆ(q)))(v(q)− vˆ(q)− qvˆ′(q)).
By Euler-Lagrange equation, we get
∂F
∂vˆ
− d
dx
∂F
∂vˆ′
= 0
And we have
∂F
∂v
=
∂x
∂vˆ
(v − vˆ − qvˆ′)− x
∂F
∂v′
=
∂x
∂vˆ′
(v − vˆ − qvˆ′)− qx
d
dx
∂F
∂vˆ′
=
d ∂x∂vˆ′ (v − vˆ − qvˆ′)
dq
− x− q dx
dq
= −x− q∂x
∂vˆ
v′ − q∂x
∂q
The last equality holds because ∂x∂y′ =
∂x
∂R
∂R
∂vˆ′ = 0
So
∂x
∂vˆ
(v − vˆ) + ∂x
∂q
= 0 (12)
Note that the equation only related to variable vˆ(q) and q, it is not a differential equation. So if
the equation have no solution, or the solution vˆ(q) is not monotone decreasing, then there is no
equilibrium of fake distribution.
If the equation has a decreasing solution vˆ(q). Since ∂x∂vˆ =
∂x
∂R
∂R
∂vˆ ,
∂x
∂vˆ =
∂x
∂q
∂R
∂q , by definition of
the allocation rule x, ∂x∂R always non-negative. And by Lemma 8.3 we have
∂x
∂vˆ ≥ 0, ∂x∂q ≤ 0. By
this we get v ≥ vˆ
Note that the nature boundary condition ∂F∂vˆ′ |q=0,1 = 0 is x∗(1) = 0. it is automatically satisfied
for symmetric equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 8.4. The revenue on equilibrium of fake distribution is
REV = n
∫ 1
0
(1− q)n−1(vˆ(q) + qv(q))dq = n
∫ 1
0
(1− q)n−1d(qvˆ(q)) =
∫ 1
0
(n− 1)(1− q)n−2vˆ(q)dq
Substitute vˆ for v we get the revenue of second-price auction
∫ 1
0 (n− 1)(1− q)n−2v(q)dq
By Lemma 8.3, we get REV ≤ REV2.
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G some other mechanism families
In this section we discuss two special mechanism families.
Definition G.1. (Mechanism family with target distribution v(·))
The mechanism family {M f(·)|f(·) ∈ Fn}, set all the allocation rule to 0 in all mechanisms,
except one special mechanism M f(·) such that fi(q) + qf ′i(q) = vi(q) for any i.
Define M f(·) as following:
Allocate the item to the buyer with the largest virtual value f(q) + qf ′(q). The payment rule is
according to (2) (give slightly disturb so that buyers can get positive utility).
Lemma G.2. Given buyers’ true valuation distributions v(·), the mechanism family with target
distribution v(·) can extract almost all the social surplus, i.e.,
REV =
∫
·
max
i
vi(qi)dq
Proof. By definition, the only equilibrium for buyers are vˆi(q) = vi(q), for any i, otherwise they
both will get 0 utility.
In mechanism M f (·), from definition we know that, fix the quantile profile q, the revenue is the
maximum virtual value of fi, that is max vi(q).
However, this mechanism only performs well when buyers have the exact true type distribution.
It gets 0 revenue at all other cases. Since the prior distributions are private information, the seller
can not design this kind of mechanism family in advance.
In next mechanism we will show that the revenue gap between normal setting and fake distri-
bution setting can be infinite.
Definition G.3. (Mechanism family with respect to quantile) The mechanism allocate the item to
the buyer whose corresponding quantile of the bid b ,i.e., 1− F (b), is minimum. The payment rule
is according to (2).
It is a truthful mechanism family.
Lemma G.4. For mechanism family with respect to quantile, the revenue gap between normal
setting and fake distribution setting can be infinite.
Proof. Consider symmetric environment, in normal setting, i.e., vˆ(q) = v(q), by payment identity
the revenue is equal to the revenue of second-price auction with prior distribution v(q). In fake
distribution setting, since buyer’s interim allocation rule is not related to vˆ(q) (x∗(q) = 1− q), the
buyer can report a fake distribution vˆ(q) = 0, so that the total expect payment is 0. Note that
by definition the seller always guarantees a non-negative revenue, so this fake distribution is an
equilibrium of fake distribution, of which the revenue is 0.
So the revenue gap can be infinite.
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